The experience of the global financial crisis revealed that while many financial institutions were allowed to take excessive risks, the auditors failed in their duties to reasonably evaluate those risks as well as to inform the investing public about them. The issues of statutory auditors' liability and their public role are particularly relevant in Lithuania, considering the fact that over just the past few years the third and the fourth largest banks in Lithuania turned out to be insolvent. Analysis of legal actions against auditors of these banks highlighted certain shortcomings in the audit market and auditors'
INTRODUCTION
The issues of statutory auditors' liability and their public role are particularly relevant in Lithuania, considering the fact that in 2011 then the largest Lithuanian domestic bank, the third largest bank by deposits and the fifth by assets 5 -Snoras -became insolvent due to alleged fraud and misappropriation of assets; and a few years later the fourth largest bank in Lithuania by deposits, Ūkio bankas, turned out to be insolvent mainly due to the irresponsible actions of its main shareholder, who used the bank's assets to finance business projects related to him. Notably, both of the banks had unqualified auditor's opinions issued by statutory auditors less than a year before the banks became de facto insolvent. The analysis of the legal actions against the auditors of Snoras and Ūkio bankas that is presented in this article highlights certain shortcomings in audit market and auditors' liability regulation related to the quality and transparency of audit reports, auditors' accountability and independence requirements, and insurance of auditors' liability. These problems are systematic not only in Lithuania but in all over Europe. Because legal regulation of the financial markets was unable to keep pace over the past fifteen years, the structure and the key features of the global financial system have changed dramatically. 4 It is one of the first attempts in Lithuania to scientifically analyse the legal responsibility of auditors after bankruptcies of financial institutions. As a matter of fact, the consequences of bankruptcies of sizable financial institutions are long lasting and still very palpable today. It should also be noted that the conclusions of the article "The Bank and Credit Union Disasters in Lithuania: Where Were the Lawyers" (2015) 7 are applicable for auditors' liability, especially analysis of incentives of professionals misconduct in terms of psychological biases, the pressures of organizational culture, and so forth.
THE BANK AND CREDIT UNION DISASTERS IN LITHUANIA: THE

ROLE OF AUDITORS
During the period of its independence 8 Lithuania has seen sixteen banks go bankrupt-twelve of them in 1994-1995. However, in 2011-2013 two banks-the fifth and the sixth largest banks in the country-suffered bankruptcies and three credit unions collapsed. These debacles nearly brought the entire Lithuanian financial system to its knees, resulting in banking crisis. Moreover, the biggest credit union "Vilniaus taupomoji kasa" collapsed in 2014. Activity of another credit union "Amber" was restricted in the summer of 2016 and alarming news about shaky activity of some other credit unions was disseminated through the media. 6 Julija Kiršienė, "The Bank and Credit Union Disasters in Lithuania: Where Were the Lawyers?" Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 7:2 (2015) // DOI: 10.1515/bjlp-2015-0003. 7 Ibid. 8 Lithuanian independence was restored in March of 1990, so just over twenty years ago.
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For empirical analysis of auditors' role and liability in insolvencies of financial institutions we selected the cases of Snoras and Ūkio bankas bankruptcies in Lithuania. It should also be noted that bankruptcies of Snoras and Ūkio Bankas, which are analysed in this paper, can barely be associated to the recent financial crisis, which peaked in 2008-2009, but rather with the systematic issues of corporate misconduct. It should also be noted that until the noisy collapse of Snoras bank, no one from the larger institutional structures designated to supervise activity of financial institutions in Lithuania, including the Central Bank of Lithuania,
FCIS (Financial Crime Investigation Service), Snoras auditing company Ernst and
Young Baltic, and others, blew the whistle.
"ERNST & YOUNG BALTIC" RESPONSIBILITY FOR SNORAS
BANKRUPTCY
In the fourth quarter of 2011 then the largest Lithuanian domestic bank, the third largest bank by deposits and the fifth by assets 9 , Snoras, became insolvent due to alleged fraud and misappropriation of assets.
Suspicions of fraud and money laundering came to light as the Bank of Lithuania sought to verify the value of some financial assets that Snoras reportedly held abroad, but which appeared to be missing. While investigations are ongoing, some preliminary findings are that (i) various assets recorded in Snoras' balance sheet had been transferred out of Snoras ownership; (ii) Snoras' assets had been provided to other banks as collateral for loans to companies allegedly related to key individuals related to Snoras (this collateral was called upon at the time Snoras entered bankruptcy, causing significant loss); and (iii) certain assets had been purchased at above market value from companies allegedly related to key individuals related to Snoras, thereby overstating the value on Snoras' balance sheet.
10
On 7th December 2011, the bankruptcy administrator adjusted Snoras' financial information and concluded that the fair value of the bank's assets is approximately € 1.2 billion less than it was [previously] stated, and that therefore the bank is insolvent.
The authorities considered several restructuring options, and even passed additional legislation in December 2011 to allow for a good bank-bad bank approach. However, in the light of the criminal allegations facing the bank, and the authorities' assessment that a merger or P&A 11 would unlikely be successful ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 2 2016
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especially not under the given time constraint, the authorities chose liquidation.
12
The appointed bankruptcy administrator Neil Cooper stated that:
The failure of Snoras was the largest insolvency event ever seen in Lithuania and it has had a significant impact on many of its customers and counterparties in Lithuania and internationally. As well as being a significant Lithuanian bank, the major assets and liabilities of Snoras were international, making the bankruptcy a complex multi-jurisdictional matter. 13 In addition, "the vast geographical spread of creditors, operations and potentially recoverable assets means that this is a truly international bankruptcy case of considerable scale." Therefore, the auditor released an unqualified audit opinion unreasonably. The
Audit Authority imposed disciplinary penalties on the audit company and the auditor himself by ordering EYB to improve its auditing controls and cancelling the auditors' license of the EYB employee. 17 It was emphasized that EYB performed the audit of public interest entity and therefore the disciplinary penalty was imposed according to the scale of harm to public interest. The Audit Authority's report was considered to be a path for future litigation against EYB.
In October 2012, the Prosecutor General announced that after the examination of Snoras audit report of 2010 executed by EYB it opens a pre-trial investigation of EYB alleged failure to perform official duties (The Lithuanian Penal
Code, Article 229):
A civil servant or a person equivalent thereto who fails to perform his duties through negligence or performs them inappropriately, where this incurs major damage to the State, a legal or natural person, shall be punished by deprivation of the right to be employed in a certain position or to engage in a certain type of activities or by fine or by arrest or by imprisonment for a term of up to two years. 18 It was stated that the audit had significant deficiencies and a pre-trial investigation of the case was assigned to Vilnius Board of the Special Investigation Service. EYB maintained the position that the audit complied with relevant auditing standards.
EYB and the auditor appealed the Audit Authority's decision to impose a disciplinary penalty.
In consequently, the disciplinary penalty -correct deficiencies in the auditing control system -imposed by the Audit Authority to EYB was reasonable. 21 In October 2014, Snoras (in bankruptcy administration) and EYB signed a settlement agreement resolving the disputes related to Snoras audits prior its bankruptcy:
As part of this settlement EYB has agreed to pay 40,000,000 LTL into the bankruptcy estate. The parties are pleased to have the matter resolved amicably and in a manner that is mutually beneficial to both parties and Snoras' creditors.
The settlement has concluded without any admissions of responsibility by either party and recognizes the commercial benefits in bringing this matter to a close.
22
After the settlement EYB became one of the defendants in another lawsuit. 
24
The case is ongoing.
To conclude, the collapse of Snoras bank was the largest bankruptcy case in Lithuania. The failure to fulfil a public role by the bank's auditors was especially significant, considering that the principal owners of the bank faced criminal charges for alleged fraudulent accounting, meaning that the auditor not only failed to inform the public about the accurate financial risks, but also overlooked indications of fraud and money laundering by releasing an unreasonably unqualified auditor's opinion.
DELOITTE'S ROLE IN ŪKIO BANKAS INSOLVENCY
In the beginning of 2013, after the inspection of AB Ūkio bankas, the Bank of Court emphasized that the purpose for implementing disciplinary penalty is to deprive a person from a right to be employed as an auditor for a certain period of time. After three years the person has a right to retake auditor's exam. The Court explained that if the disciplinary penalty would be suspended for a period of a trial, the whole purpose of the disciplinary penalty could be undermined in case the trial lasts three years or more throughout which the auditor keeps its title and after the trial is over can retake the exam despite the verdict. Furthermore, the court confirmed that the auditor's arguments for suspending the disciplinary penalty related to the possibility of future financial loss are not relevant in this case and are not consistent with the practice of Lithuanian courts; therefore, the decision of The plaintiff claims that due to auditors' violations the bank has incurred direct losses (because of faulty audits the bank has increased its liabilities) and indirect losses (due to increased liabilities the bank's ability to meet creditors' claims decreased). The case is ongoing.
DISCUSSION OF THE CASES
The analysis of legal actions against auditors following collapses of both The additional report aims to increase further audit quality and avoid any loopholes, via enhanced communication between the statutory auditor or the audit firm on the one hand, and the entity's audit committee on the other hand.
The additional report will provide the audited PIE with more detailed information on the outcome of the statutory audit, including for instance on the methodology used, on possible significant deficiencies identified in the internal control system, on the valuation methods applied, etc. Nonetheless, in the initial proposal for the Regulation by the EC the maximum term for mandatory rotation was 6 years with a possibility of extension to 12 years.
In the adopted Regulation the maximum terms for mandatory rotation are accordingly 10 years and 24 years. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 2 2016
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Snoras and Ūkio bankas cases, it is uncertain whether having a mandatory rotation every two decades would actually prevent statutory auditors from close association with the management of audited entity. Therefore, further limitation of rotation terms is recommended.
It is evident that EU audit market reform brings positive changes in audit market regulation and supervision. However, it is critical that these changes would be followed by a shift in culture of financial institutions.
Because the behavior of the financial sector has not changed fundamentally in a number of dimensions since the crisis … -the idea that private misbehavior can have a broader social cost-is only in its early stages. … To restore trust, we need a shift toward greater integrity and accountability. We need a stronger and 
66
A study by London Economics found that:
The current level of commercial insurance is such that it would cover less than 5 % of the larger claims some firms face nowadays in some EU Member States. ...
Once a firm has exhausted the limited cover provided by the network's captive and commercial insurers, the remaining source of funds is essentially the partners' income. At issue then for a firm is how large an income cut partners would be willing to take before leaving the firm in drove, resulting in the collapse of the firm.
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As previously mentioned, in Lithuania as well as in a majority of the EU In a regime of joint and several liability, any statutory audit liability limitation will help address the 'deep pocket' syndrome whereby the audit firm is typically viewed by plaintiffs as having the largest resources and is therefore the target of complaints irrespective of the contribution and responsibility of the firm to the event giving rise to the complaint. 
CONCLUSIONS
1.
Because the banking sector is considered one of the most important and sensitive sectors of the economy, it is pivotal to maintain public confidence in the banking system. Hence, auditors must understand the complexity of their activities, as well as the risk exposures, and know that a very wide range of stakeholders rely on their reporting; thus, by releasing faulty reports, auditors harm the public interest.
Case analysis of legal procedures against auditors in the Snoras and
Ūkio bankas bankruptcies highlighted the need for more coherent audit quality and transparency requirements, improved auditors' accountability and supervision procedures, strengthened auditors' independence regime, as well as shortcomings of auditors' civil liability insurance and disciplinary and civil liability regulation.
3.
The new European legal framework on audit regulation intends to clarify auditors' public role throughout increasing quality of statutory audits, enhancing transparency of audit process, and strengthening the role of audit committees. It also introduces mandatory rotation with a maximum term of 10 years, with a possibility of extension to 24 years. However, having in mind the auditors' independence issues in Snoras and Ūkio bankas cases, it is uncertain whether having a mandatory rotation every two decades would actually prevent statutory auditors from close association with the management of audited entity. Thus, it is critical that changes of legal regulation would be followed by a shift in the culture of financial institutions.
4.
The auditors' liability issue is excluded from the reform. 
